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Fashionable IP or IP for Fashion?
Norman L. Balmer*
Lisa Hedrick's note, Tearing Fashion Design Protection Apart at the
Seams,' addresses yet another mismatch between creativity and statutory
incentives for creativity. She raises the quintessential question affecting all
intellectual property: Would statutory protection for creativity be beneficial?
She insightfully concludes that proposed legislation for fashion design
protection may, if enacted, have an illusory effect.
Hedrick and other commentators are quite persuasive in their analyses of
existing intellectual property law.2 They conclude that fashion has no
meaningful statutory protection.3 The paradox relating to the level of creativity
in the fashion industry is explored by Professors Raustiala and Sprigman:
Why, when other major content industries have obtained and made use of
increasingly powerful IP protections for their products, does fashion design
remain mostly unprotected? That the fashion industry produces high levels
of innovation, and attracts the investment necessary to continue in this vein,
is a puzzle for the orthodox justification for IP rights.4
The Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power to "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." 5 Congress has opted to exercise its authority in limited, but
nevertheless expansive, ways. Referencing committee reports accompanying
the 1952 Patent Act, the Supreme Court noted the intent of Congress to have
"anything under the sun that is made by man" as statutory subject matter for
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
1. Lisa J. Hedrick, Tearing Fashion Design Protection Apart at the Seams, 65 WAsH. &
LEE L. REv. 215 (2008).
2. Hedrick's survey of intellectual property did not include trade secrets and confidential
information, which can be forms of significant protection of intellectual property in some
industries. Id. at 222-29. Unless one was marketing certain golden clothes to a proverbial
emperor, intellectual property based on secrecy is not a viable method to protect the fashion
industry.
3. Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REv. 1687, 1775 (2006).
4. Id. at 1691.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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patents. Although the patent laws are limited in that the invention needs to be
useful, novel, and inventive, 7 the patent grant8 is the same for a pharmaceutical
that may have cost a billion dollars to discover and develop as it is for the
proverbial better mousetrap. Similarly, copyright laws protect certain creative
works that are not useful articles,9 and the exclusionary right is the same for a
work created in ten seconds as it is for one that involved a lifetime-it is the
same for a soda can label as for a literary masterpiece.' 0 The protection
provided by copyright, like patents, is blind in its legislation to the industry and
cost of development.
Patents and copyrights are thus very blunt tools available to Congress for
forging policy pertaining to creativity and innovation. But have these blunt
statutory tools worked? Perhaps part of the answer lies in defining the criteria
for determining whether a tool has worked. If one takes the natural rights labor
theory view of John Locke, then the policy goal is focused on the individual
who has made something that is his own. l' A utilitarian theory, on the other
hand, focuses on maximizing the benefits to the community.'
2
Regardless of the economic theory used, there is no controlled experiment
to prove or disprove the impact of statutory intellectual property.
Commentators have therefore heavily relied upon anecdotal evidence.'
3
Consequently, the debate continues as to whether or not patents and copyrights
are achieving whatever policy goal is selected.
14
Over the past two centuries, the United States has changed from an
agrarian economy to an industrial economy to what some call a service
economy.' 5 The patent statute has been called upon to address technologies
6. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citations omitted).
7. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (2000).
8. Id. § 271.
9. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000); see also id. § 101 (defining "useful article").
10. Id. §§ 106,302.
11. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 958 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "Lockean labor theory").
12. See id. at 1581 (defining "utilitarianism").
13. See generally Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32
MGMT. SCI. 173 (1986).
14. See, e.g., Dan L. Burke & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REv. 1575, 1577 (2003) ("[T]here is no reason to assume that a unitary patent system will
optimally encourage innovation in the wide range of diverse industries that it is expected to
cover."); see also Michael H. Davis, Patent Politics, 56 S.C. L. REv. 337, 386 (2004) ("Failure
to understand that patent law plays an active role in fashioning a national industrial policy, or
ignorance of the sheer presence of such a policy, leaves the country and its economy at the
mercy of that policy.").
15. See, e.g., 150 CONG. REc. H615, H620 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Dreier) (noting the changes in the economy since the formation of the United States).
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that could not have been even fathomed in 1790 such as iPhones and instant
mashed potatoes. Yet, today's patent statute does not differ substantially from
the first patent statute enacted in 1793.16 The copyright statutes have proven
not to be as malleable to changes in technology and have been periodically
amended to explicitly address changes in technology such as video tapes, cable
television, computer chips, e-books, and the internet. 17 The legislative
responses to these technological changes have typically not been single-
industry-focused and Congress has availed itself of counsel from broad based
study groups.' 
8
Proposed fashion design protection legislation has a single-industry focus.
To the extent that this legislation is technology driven, it is caused by the ease
and speed with which information can be transmitted throughout the globe.
The question in my mind is whether single-industry-focused intellectual
property legislation can provide a petri dish for measuring the net effect of
statutory intellectual property as an incentive for creativity and/or as a benefit
for society.
Over the past three decades, Congress has been faced with more single
industry pleas for statutory protection in light of real or perceived inequities.' 9
16. The Patent Act of 1793 defines patentable subject matter as "any new and useful art,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement [thereof)."
Patent Act of 1973, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 319 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376
(2000)).
17. See, e.g., Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (2000)) (adding computer programs to the
copyright law); see also Act of Nov. 1, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, § 5(a), 109 Stat. 336, 348
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)) (defining "digital transmissions"); see
generally Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). Interestingly, the 1790 Copyright Act
afforded protection only for "maps, charts and books," the very types of documents sought for
the Library of Congress. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1802).
The Copyright Office began registering computer programs in 1964 by interpreting them to be
literary works. See I NETLBOORSTYN,BOORSTYNONCOPYRIGHT§ 2.14[1][a] (2000) (discussing
the copyrightability of computer programs).
18. For example, in 1974 Congress established the National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) to make recommendations for changes in
the copyright law, especially the copyrightability of computer programs. Act of Dec. 31, 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 201, 88 Stat. 1873, 1873.
19. While most of the single-industry-focused legislative proposals have been promoted
by the creators of intellectual property, that is not always the case. Automobile manufacturing
companies have secured design patents to protect body parts. See generally In re Certain Auto.
Parts, No. 377-TA-557, 2007 WL 2021234 (Int'l Trade Comm'n July 5,2007). In response, the
Quality Part Coalition has urged legislative changes to prevent the vehicle manufacturing
companies from using design patents to exclude their members from marketing replacement
parts. See Quality Parts Coalition, About Us, http://www.qualitypartscoalition.com/about/
about.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2007) ("The QPC is committed to working with Congress to
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For example, the pharmaceutical research houses sought patent term extension
to remedy the loss of patent term due to the lengthy approval process before the
Federal Drug Administration (FDA).20 The pharmaceutical research houses
argued that incentives were needed to continue to invest in costly research and
development (R&D) expense to bring to the public new drugs.2 ' Since the
enactment of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984,2 numerous amendments have been made affecting the pharmaceutical
industry as a whole and the FDA approval process.23 In 2006, the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released a study analyzing the research
performance of the pharmaceutical industry and its profitability. 4 In 2005,
R&D spending was nearly $40 billion.25  The dynamics of drug research
spending, however, are complex. The CBO stated: "Even though conventional
accounting measures overstate the profitability of the drug industry, strong
growth in the industry's R&D spending over many years suggests that the
returns on pharmaceutical R&D have been attractive."2 6 They also noted: "The
additional revenue that results from the effect of insurance on the demand for
prescription drugs-combined with strong patent protection-can give
companies excessive incentives to invest in drug R&D., 27 While far beyond
the scope of this Comment, the proposition that patent term restoration
enhanced the incentives for research and development cannot be dismissed.
The societal benefit, however, may not be so clear.
The single-industry-focused efforts to amend the patent and copyright laws
often revolve around a court decision that the industry members consider
unfair. The Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO) sought a legislative
ensure that U.S. design patent law preserves competition, protects consumers' rights and halts
the expansion of an auto industry monopoly at the expense of the American consumer.") (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Public Law 104-208 amended the patent laws to
eliminate any remedy for infringement by a medical practitioner's performance of a patented
medical activity. Act of Sept. 30, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 616, 110 Stat. 3009, 3067
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000)).
20. See generally OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, PATENT TERM EXTENSION AND THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (1981).
21. See, e.g., id. at 3 (summarizing the arguments of the pharmaceutical industry).
22. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
23. E.g., Generic Animal Drug and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 100-670,
102 Stat. 3971 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
24. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, STUDY: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEurICAL
INDUSTRY (2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
25. Id. at 36 fig.5-1.
26. Id. at4.
27. Id. at 48.
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overturning of In re Durden,28 a case in which an old process was found not to
be patentable simply because a previously unknown starting material was used.
For the biotech industry, using existing processes with new starting materials
was a primary course of research.29 The initial bills, which were broadened to
cover the chemical industry, were opposed by the chemical industry.30 During
the pendency of the bills in Congress, the Federal Circuit distinguished and
limited In re Durden in a manner that essentially eliminated the adverse effect
on the biotechnology industry.31 BIO, nevertheless, continued its lobbying
efforts leading to the Patent Law Amendment of 1995 (Biotech Process Patent
Act).32 Ironically, commentators have urged that to promote patentability,
biotechnology inventors should not use the provisions of the special
legislation.
Another example of a specialized legislative response to a court decision
involved copyrights and architecture. Courts held that while the plans for an
architectural work were subject to copyright, the structure itself was not.34
Congress considered explicit copyright coverage for the structure itself,35 in
28. In re Durden, 763 F.2d 1406, 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding that the use of
nonobvious starting materials did not create a nonobvious, patentable process). See R.R., After
Five Years, Biotechnology Patent Protection Act Is Law, BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, Nov. 6,
1995, at 6 (noting that BIO "had fought hard for" the passage of the Biotechnology Process
Patent Protection Act).
29. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 24, at 40 (stating that the extension of
patent term would effectively delay the innovation of firms that primarily focus R&D on
"unpatentable modifications of existing drugs").
30. The Chemical Manufacturers Association (now the American Chemistry Council)
lobbied to amend the bill to cover only the biotech industry.
31. In re Ochiai, 71 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that there are no per se
rules under In re Durden or other case law for determining obviousness; as such, each case
should be examined on a case-by-case basis); see 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS
§ 5.04[8][b][ii] (2005) (discussing the aftermath of In re Durden).
32. Act of Nov. 1, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-41, 109 Stat. 351 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 103
(2000)).
33. See, e.g., Ladas & Parry, LLP, Patentability of Process Claims in the United States
(Aug. 14, 1996), http://www.ladas.com/Patents/Biotechnology/Durden-ProcessClaims.html (last
visited Dec. 30, 2007) (suggesting that a patentee who opts for a process claim rather than a
petition under the new legislation will "have an added weapon to prevent the importation of
products made by its patented process") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
34. See, e.g., Demetriades v. Kaufman, 680 F. Supp. 658, 664-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
("Although plaintiffs may have a valid copyright in the architectural plans that served as the
basis for the Demetriades house, that protection simply does not extend to the design or the
house itself absent a design patent.").
35. See 136 CONG. REC. 1733 (Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) ("[The
Architectural Works Copyright Act of 1990] is intended to cover an architect's artistic
expression. It does not encompass methods of construction, or purely functional elements
comprised of standard features .. ").
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significant part due to the fact that on the international front, the Berne
Convention permitted such copyrights and the United States sought to comply
with the treaty.36 Although Representative Kastenmeier noted some difficulties
in the extension of copyright protection to architectural works,37 Congress took
the steps necessary to be in compliance with the Berne Convention. Since
enactment of the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act 38 (AWCPA),
several litigations have ensued asserting copyright infringement of architectural
works.
In Yankee Candle Co. v. New England Candle Co.,39 the court found
copyright infringement of the architectural blueprints based on the similarities
between two structures at issue.40 Similarly, in Rottlund Co. v. Pinnacle
Corp., 41 the court stipulated that the alleged infringer's architect had access to
the plaintiffs architectural plans. 42 Chirco v. Gateway Oaks, LLC,43 involved a
condominium-type development having a unique arrangement of garages and
opposing buildings.44 Again, the infringer had access to the plans.4 5 Trek
Leasing, Inc. v. United States46 involved a building constructed as a post
office.47 The sole copyright at issue was the structure itself.48 The copyright
was found to be "thin" and the alleged infringement was sufficiently different
that no infringement was found.49
36. See id. (introducing the Architectural Works Copyright Act of 1990, which was
drafted to bring the United States in compliance with the Beme Convention).
37. Id.
38. Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 701-706, 104
Stat. 5089, 5133-34 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
39. Yankee Candle Co. v. New Eng. Candle Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 154, 160 (D. Mass.
1998) (finding invalid Yankee Candle Company's copyright of an architectural work but finding
valid its copyright of the architectural blueprints).
40. Id. at 160-61.
41. Rottlund Co. v. Pinnacle Corp., 222 F.R.D. 362, 386 (D. Minn. 2004) (imposing
sanctions on Pinnacle for its abusive conduct during discovery and other judicial processes).
42. Id.
43. Chirco v. Gateway Oaks, LLC, No. 02-CV-73188, 2005 WL 1355482, at *8 (E.D.
Mich. 2005) (rejecting the defendant's contention that the plaintiff's building was in the public
domain and granting summary judgment for the plaintiff).
44. Id. at *2.
45. Id. at *5.
46. Trek Leasing, Inc. v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 8, 11 (2005) (granting the defendant's
motion for summary judgment because of the plaintiff's failure to show substantial similarity).
47. Id. at 10.
48. Id. (identifying the only remaining claim as whether there was an infringement of the
actual architectural work).
49. Id. at 20.
280
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Although the AWCPA has been in effect for over fifteen years, it appears
that it has a limited effect on the architecture business and on creativity. First,
those constructing large projects likely have little interest having the
construction look like another large building. Second, with small projects, a
party has little financial incentive to copy a design in the absence of plans
because of the cost of the services required to recreate the plans. The exception
is where significant secondary benefit will be obtained, such as a consumer
draw to the design of stores or the siting of condominiums.
Another single-industry-focused legislation is the Vessel Hull Design
Protection Act (VHDPA) enacted in 1998.50 The impetus for the VHDPA was
the Supreme Court decision in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., which held that the Florida statutory protection on boat hull design was
52preempted by the Constitution. It is less expensive to make a mold for a
vessel hull from an existing hull than it is to design a mold anew.53 The creator
of a vessel hull must proceed from drawings to mold fabrication, and a picture
of the hull, or even the drawings, will still leave a potential pirate with
substantial expense when creating the mold. Thus, the real effect of the
VHDPA is to protect the maker of a mold from another's design based off the
original mold, not so much the creativity behind the design. The VHDPA
requires that the vessel hull possess originality with a distinguishable variation
over similar works which is not simply trivial.55
Thus far, only one reported case involves the VHDPA.56 The paucity of
litigated cases may be indicative of the relatively few hull design registrations
and the existence of other adequate hull designs that can be freely used and
copied. If so, the VHDPA would only seem to provide a financial incentive to
the designer where substantial consumer demand exists for the specific design,
and then sufficient incentive would exist for a competitor to create a similar
hull design with sufficient modifications to avoid infringement. In essence,
designing around an existing design would be less costly than litigation for
those few designs that have a market pull.
50. Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, §§ 501-502, 112 Stat.
2905-16 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1332 (2000)).
51. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989) (finding
Florida's statutory protection for vessel hulls to be preempted by the Constitution).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 144.
54. Id.
55. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1302 (2000).
56. Seegenerally Maverick Boat Co. v. Am. Marine Holdings, Inc., 418 F.3d 1186(11th
Cir. 2005).
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In the one reported case, Maverick Boat Co. v. American Marine
Holdings, Inc., 7 a registered boat hull design was found not to meet the
originality standard and was denied protection.58 That the court in Maverick
Boat, and the court in Trek Leasing, focused on the standards for registration
and scope of protection is not surprising. The courts are mindful of, and may
be specifically called upon to address, the scope of the constitutional authority
of Congress to create monopolies for intellectual property. Is there, as Justice
Douglas stated in his concurring opinion in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Equipment Corp. 59 a constitutional standard defining the level of
creativity that must be met for an exclusive right?60 If so, only a qualified
power resides in Congress.
In none of the examples of industry-specific intellectual property
legislation is there irrefutable evidence that an increase in creativity has
occurred solely because of the additional intellectual property protection.
Without a doubt, patent term restoration has resulted in more income to the
pharmaceutical companies because of the lengthened patent term. It is not
clear, however, that the Biotech Process Patent Act, the AWCPA, or the
VHDPA have netted increased income to innovators and creators in the
relevant industries. Rather, it is much more likely that such single-industry-
focused legislation is income neutral with few exceptions. With an income
neutral intellectual property benefit, where are the financial incentives for
investment in creativity and innovation? True, the AWCPA and VHDPA may
give some psychological comfort and thus incentives to those who create
because copying is prohibited. But with the limited scope of protection,
perhaps the sense of security is illusory.
Setting aside patent term restoration, the societal impacts of the Biotech
Process Patent Act, the AWCPA, and the VHDPA do not appear to be
negative. The costs under these acts, especially in light of the paucity of
litigation, have been nominal considering the size of the industries.
Interestingly, Congress has been able to sate special interest groups without
adversely affecting society. Fashion design protection, given its shortcomings
as Ms. Hedrick ably notes, appears to fall into the same category.
57. Id. at 1192 (passing over the question of infringement because the plaintiff did not
have a protected hull design).
58. Id. (finding that the changes the plaintiff made to its hull design did not create an
original design but rather corrected mistakes to render the "original design what it was always
intended to be").
59. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supernkt. Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
60. Id. at 154 (Douglas, J., concurring).
